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Abstract
The initial years of transition in the Russian Federation have been characterised by relatively
smaller falls in employment than in other reform-orientated countries of eastern Europe, despite
the huge negative shock caused by the move from planned to market economy. Using information
from two complementary household survey data sets, we show that for many Russian workers, the
dominant form of labour market adjustment has instead been the delayed receipt of wages. Other
forms of adjustment at the intensive margin have not been used much.  Wage arrears are found
across the private, state and budgetary sector in approximately equal proportions.  There are large
regional variations in the incidence of wage arrears.  Workers in the metropolitan centre are
significantly less affected by delayed and incomplete wage payments than workers in the
provinces.  There is less evidence that individual characteristics contribute much toward the
incidence of wage arrears, though unobserved heterogeneity may have some role to play. As with
the incidence of unemployment, however, there is evidence that the persistence of arrears is
concentrated on a subset of the working population. We show that workers can only exercise the
exit option of a job quit from a firm paying wages in arrears if the outside labour market is
sufficiently dynamic.
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1Grime and Punishment: 
Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian
Federation 
Hartmut Lehmann, Jonathan Wadsworth  and Alessandro Acquisti
“All these new ideas, reforms, theories, have penetrated even to us in the provinces, but to see the whole
picture and see it clearly, one must be in the capital” Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 1866
1.  Introduction
Five years into transition, the Russian labour market still seems to be different from labour markets
in other reform-oriented transition economies.  Despite falling state spending, hardening budget
constraints, a loosening of price controls, exposure to international competition and an ensuing 30-
40% fall in aggregate output since 1992, the claimant unemployment rate is still under 4% and
employment has fallen by less than 10%, both less dramatic changes than observed elsewhere,
(Russian Economic Trends 1997).  Continued uncertainty surrounding the transition process has
led to a series of conflicts over enterprise funds between the tax authorities, the banks and the
workforce, between enterprises and their regional governments, between the regions and the
centre. 
Against this background of uncertainty and negative economic shocks, aggregate
employment levels remain relatively high. Why this may be so is the subject of this paper. If
employment has not fallen much, it is possible that firms have adjusted to contractions in sales of
their goods and growing liquidity constraints in other ways.  Adjustments on the intensive, rather
than the extensive, margin such as involuntary unpaid leave of absence, a reduction in hours
worked, or the increased use of temporary contract working are all possibilities. Commander,
McHale and Yemtsov (1995) and Foley (1995) have mooted that a higher degree of employment
instability may be more common in the emerging private sector, where, in a climate of uncertainty,
workers may be more vulnerable to layoffs and short-term contracts than in the state sector. A
further potential source of insecurity could be that employees, even those with permanent contracts,
are faced with compulsory reductions in working hours. Moreover, some firms may tell their
workers not to report for work whilst not making them redundant. In so doing, the enterprise avoids
salary expenses and does not have to make redundancy payments.
There may also be another way for firms to cope with the effects of transition. Price, rather
than quantity, adjustment through the non-payment of wages is an alternative means by which firms
could have adjusted their cost schedules. There is little doubt that the problem has worsened in
recent years.  Wage arrears have risen by around 50% since the beginning of 1996. Goskomstat
figures put the aggregate stock of arrears at the beginning of 1997 at around 50 trillion roubles,
some 138% of the monthly wage bill, (Russian Economic Trends 1997).  As yet there is little hard
evidence at the micro level. This paper attempts to help fill that gap. 
Standing (1996a, b) presents establishment-level evidence of large regional variations in
the proportion of firms who had experienced ‘a lot’ of wage arrears. However this data is only
qualitative. Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) conclude that, on their evidence from a sample of firms,
wage arrears do not pose a major problem in the Russian Federation. They believe that
wage arrears are small when compared to trade arrears, uncorrelated with severe financial
1. Layard and Richter (1995) give a cross-tabulation of the extent of 1994 wage arrears using a VCIOM survey
of individuals, while Gordon (1997), using VCIOM data, shows the overall rising incidence of wage arrears
between 1992 and 1996.
2. The supplement was developed by the authors, Evgenyi Gontmacher, Ingrid Leiprecht, Douglas Lippoldt, Viktor
Starodubrovskyi aand Ruslan Yemtsov with the TACIS-Ace project - The Performance of Regional Labour Market
Types in the Russian Federation (T94-1073-R).
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distress and mainly used by management to extract tax concessions from the government. Certainly,
the collection of tax revenues is a priority of the federal government. Clarke, Ashwin and Borisov
(1997), suggest that these implicit or explicit agreements between the federal government and the
banks over the seconding of enterprise bank deposits in order to meet federal tax and debt
liabilities has left many firms with little cash to pay wages, irrespective of the firm’s profitability.
A lack of credit facilities in the banking sector then exacerbate this cash flow problem.
There are other potential contributory factors.  One idea is that wage arrears are a form of
forced loan from workers with few outside opportunities to firms in genuine distress. If the firm
is dominated by insiders with vested interests in the continued existence of the enterprise then such
loans will be more likely.  If the firm is in distress, the workers’ only outlet under existing law,
is to sue the firm for bankruptcy.  So what may arise is a form of implicit contract, whereby the
worker trades wage arrears for continued employment. Compounding this, is the role of central
government in paying off its budgetary arrears by delaying payment for state orders and refusing
to release funds for the payment of wages in the budgetary sector, (eg health, education, public
administration).
There may be large regional variation underlying country-wide events, depending on the
industrial structure, the extent of transformation, the regional government’s response to shocks and
its relationship with the centre. Also, certain types of workers could be disproportionately
affected.  No one has addressed the issue whether firms discriminate against certain workers in
their application of wage arrears,1 whether patronage is an important element or whether firms use
efficiency wage type considerations to retain the most productive members of its workforce. 
If so, these methods could have made jobs less secure for many Russian workers. There
is, however, little hard evidence on the extent to which such adjustment strategies have been
applied.  This paper tries to provide some evidence using household survey data.  We analyse all
these aspects of labour market behaviour using two individual-level data sources.  The first, a
supplement to the March 1996 Russian Labour Force Survey (RLFS), in five representative
regions with which to analyse in detail regional variations across industries, firm types and
individuals.  The second is the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a smaller, but
nationally sampled longitudinal survey of individuals, covering many of the same issues as in the
RLFS supplement and following its sample population over the period 1994 to 1996.2  Desai and
Idson (1997) use the RLMS to focus on household characteristics of those in arrears and the
likelihood that this induces bartering among those affected. We extend their analysis by introducing
more establishment characteristics and exploit the panel nature of the RLMS to examine individual
dynamics and the persistence of wage arrears. 
Whilst the problem of wage arrears may stem from the economic position of the firm and
the institutional structure during transition, we believe that responses by individuals can shed light
on some areas that would otherwise be difficult to obtain from an analysis of firms alone. Using
these two complementary data sets, we can examine how insecure employment really is in the
Russian labour market, which individuals and which sectors are most affected by it and begin to
build up a picture of the evolution of some of these trends across time.  
3. The RLMS is ambiguous on the nature of self-employment, referring instead to the extent of self-ownership
in the enterprise where the individual works. We exclude only those who say they own between 51 and 100% of
the enterprise.
4. There are no population weights in either data set.
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2.  Data
Much of our analysis is based on the March 1996 round of the Russian Labour Force Survey
(RLFS), conducted by the national and regional offices of Goskomstat. The basic survey asks
standard ILO-type questions about employment, job search and related issues to a random sample
of households in all regions of the Russian Federation.  A supplement, tailored to our research,
was added to the original survey in five Russian regions.  The five regions, Moscow City,
Moscow Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Chelyabinsk and Krasnoyarski Krai, were selected because
of their varied nature and the fact that they can be considered representative of the diffuse labour
market types throughout the Russian Federation. The appendix gives a brief description of these
regions and the questions in the supplement.  More than 17,000 households were interviewed in
these regions, leading to more than 25,000 individual records on the population of working age.
There were 10043 observations in Moscow, 7082 in Moscow Oblast, 3449 in Krasnoyarsk, 3592
in Chelyabinsk and 1488 in the Chuvash Republic. Responses by military/security personnel are
limited and so are excluded from the analysis.  Some of the variables analysed in the paper —
industry and the decomposition of ownership into de novo and privatised firms — could only be
ascertained from questions in the RLFS supplement.
Our second data source is the second phase of the Russian Longitudinal Monitor Survey
(RLMS), a longitudinal panel of around 4000 households across the Russian Federation conducted
in the Fall of each year since 1994. Like the RLFS, the data contains a set of demographic and
establishment characteristics, not always the same as in the RLFS, together with information on the
labour market activities of its sample. Despite, its relatively small size, the main advantage of this
source for our purposes, is that we can track individuals and the incidence of wage arrears over
time and control for any unobserved individual heterogeneity that may have on effect on the
probability of being paid in arrears. For example, if patronage is an important determinant of
arrears then this will be unobserved, but failure to account for this may bias our results. As with
the RLFS we restrict our sample to employees of working age, excluding the military.3 In order to
focus on the build up of wage arrears over time, we impose the additional sample restriction that
the individual appear in the survey in every wave.  This gives us a total sample of 8700
observations over the three waves of which around 3500 are in work at any wave.
The survey questions which deal with wage arrears are complementary across the two
surveys. Both ask question of the form,  “Does your place of work owe you any money?” The
RLFS supplement then asks for the month in which workers were last paid and the type of payment
made by the firm, ranging from complete and on time, to late and incomplete. The RLMS asks
simply  “How much money have in all they not paid you?” Respondents in both surveys are asked
to state the amount of money received from their employers after tax in the past month. There is no
distinction made between basic wages and any bonus. These wage responses are then deflated by
a national price deflator indexed to 100 at January 1996.4 There is no indication whether wage
arrears are estimated before or after tax. 
3.  Employment Contracts in Russia
5.  More than 90% of those on fixed term contracts would have preferred to have a permanent contract.
6. Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) show that the proportion of temporary jobs in the stock of new jobs in Britain
is around 17%.
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Even the Soviet labour market had substantial regional disparities. There were both excess labour
supply, ‘open unemployment’, regions (mainly the Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus) and
labour deficient areas, where chronic excess demand for labour was observed.  The latter
dominated what is now the Russian Federation, (Malle, 1990). Enterprises were continuously on
the lookout for workers, guaranteeing permanent employment contracts to virtually all workers,
including the newly hired.  At the heart of labour relations was an employment culture that
combined full employment with job security. This coexistence came about because it was in the
economic interest of enterprises to engage in labour hoarding continuously. It was not the result of
a political commitment to permanent employment for the entire workforce (Hanson, 1986 and Nuti,
1986).  Five years into transition, the economic environment has changed radically for enterprises
throughout the Russian Federation.  How has this affected the incidence of permanent employment?
The three types of employment contracts that workers can enter, permanent, fixed term and
one-off contracts are outlined in Table 1.  There is little variation in these variables across age,
gender and region.  The vast majority of the employed have a permanent contract.  Only for those
older than 60 years is there a noticeably higher proportion of fixed term contracts.  Having a
permanent contract does, of course, not mean that one cannot be made redundant.  Nevertheless it
is clear that in March 1996 only a small fraction of workers in these five regions had, on this
measure, uncertain job prospects.5  
  It is true, however, that short-term contracts are more prevalent in the stock of workers
with new jobs, those with tenure 12 months or less. Around 1 in 9 new jobs are not regarded as
permanent. Since new jobs are at the margin of adjustment, it may be that this is an indication of
greater insecurity in the labour market to come, though these numbers are still low by some western
standards.6 To highlight the main determinants we present probit estimates of the incidence of
permanent contracts in Table 2 for those in jobs for less than 12 months. Workers over 55 years
of age and those working less than 30 hours a week have substantially lower probabilities of
having a permanent contract. There is now evidence of a clear regional progression between the
metropolitan area and the provinces.  The typical worker entering a new jobs in Moscow is around
9 percentage points more likely to be on a temporary contract than  the typical worker in
Chelyabinsk.  Those in a firm with more than 5 employees and in a state-owned or privatised firm
raises the probability of having a permanent contract by around 8 and between 7 percentage points
respectively.  In sum, if the type of contract is taken as a measure of job security, new jobs do seem
less secure than all jobs, particularly in small firms and in the de novo private sector. This is one
more piece of evidence that de novo private firms in Russia behave differently from state-owned
and privatised firms (see Richter and Schaffer, 1996).  There is no significant difference across
industrial sectors, once other characteristics are controlled for.
When asked about employment, respondents may associate this with the enterprise where
they have deposited their ‘labour book’, whether they actually work there or not.  Nearly all those
who have deposited their ‘labour book’ with an enterprise will have a permanent contract.   For
this reason, it is useful to see how many hours those who claim to have a permanent contract
actually worked in their primary employment during the reference week and to compare these with
the usual hours worked.  Table 3 shows how the difference in actual and usual hours worked is
distributed. The majority of individuals, (91%), worked the same hours as usual, while 6.5%
worked less and 3.5% more.  Nearly half of those who worked less were on zero hours. This
7. Standing (1996b) finds that 15.2% of workers in the metals sector and 9.2% in textiles were on unpaid
leave, using a survey of Russian enterprises in May 1995.
8. In the RLFS questionnaire respondents are asked whether in the reference week they worked full- or part-
time and if the latter whether they did so against their wishes.
9. According to Goskomstat (1996a) employment fell between the beginning of 1992 and the end of 1995 by
about 7%, while GDP fell by around 40%. Production in medium and large enterprises shrank by 60% over the
same period (Russian Economic Trends 1995, Vol. 4, No.4).
10. Given the long queues in a supply constrained system and a large monetary overhang before the onset of
reforms, the drop in real wages expressed by these official figures seems rather large.
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suggests that about 3% of the sample were on leave.  About half of this group, (1.5% of the total
sample of employed workers), had not received a wage in March or February, ie they were on
unpaid leave during the reference week.7
There is some variation at regional level, with a spread of 9 percentage points between the
Chuvash Republic, where we observe the highest value and Moscow City, where only 5% of
workers worked fewer than normal hours.  Nearly 60% of those working less than their usual hours
in Chuvash, ie about 7% of employees with permanent contracts, were on zero hours during the
reference week.  In Moscow City, this figure was only 2.5%. The proportion working more than
usual is particularly high in Krasnoyarsk, where mining and mineral extraction feature prominently.
Despite these regional variations, it appears that the overwhelming majority of employees had a
permanent contract and a full workload in the spring of 1996.  
 Insecure employment can also appear in the form of part-time work,8 if substantial segments
of the workforce with permanent employment contracts worked involuntarily part-time. For the five
regions combined about three-quarters of workers who engaged in part-time work did so
involuntarily, as Table 3 demonstrates.  There are variations across regions.  Moscow City has
less than two-thirds involuntary part-timers and the Chuvash Republic has more than 95%.  The
overall incidence of part-time employment varies between 5% in Krasnoyarsk and 2.8% in
Chelyabinsk. Again, these are not dramatic numbers.  Short-time work does not seem to be the
route by which enterprises maintain employment levels. 
4.  Wage Arrears in Russia  
 
The evidence so far does not point to insecure labour market experience on the intensive margin
for most of the employed workforce.  Given the moderate fall of employment relative to output
during the first 4 years of transition,9 this seems remarkable.  One possible explanation is that there
has been wage flexibility (Layard and Richter, 1995).  At the end of 1995, average real wages had,
according to Goskomstat (1996b), fallen to around 34% of the level observed before transition
began (January 1992).10  Another price adjustment mechanism used by enterprises to counter output
shocks is the delay of wage payments to workers. By March 1996, wage arrears for the entire
economy exceeded one month’s wage bill (Goskomstat, 1996b). 
As can be seen from Table 4, the number of workers affected by arrears is huge. In the
March 1996 round of the RLFS only 60 percent of workers received their last wage in full and on
time, the proportion for women being 5 percentage points higher than for men.  About a quarter of
employees received a wage on time, but were not paid in full, whilst around 11% received their
wage late and not in full.  A further 2.7% were paid in full, but not on time.  According to the
RLMS, 60% of the employed workforce were in arrears across the whole country in 1996, up from
11. Of the 8 regions identified in the RLMS, the incidence of arrears in 1996 was 31.7% Metropolitan, 69.1%
North West, 49.3% Central, 66.3% Volga, 65.6% Caucasus, 62.9% Urals, 65.7% Western Siberia and 67.9% East.
12. In March 1996 around 42% of all employees still worked in the budgetary sector. Those in state-owned firms
in other services, transport, distribution and trade, health and education and finance are considered as being in the
budgetary sector.
13. Workers of the ‘state firm production sector’ are in state-owned firms in agriculture, manufacturing,
construction and mining.
14. One explanation of this result could be the presidential elections in 1996. Before the election the federal
government tried to pay wages in the budgetary sector wherever possible. After the election it reverted to its usual
practice of withholding wages for the provincial regions.  The aggregate data on nation wide wage arrears for 1996
would need to show a sharp increase for the second half of that year to make this story truly convincing.  However,
we do not observe, such dynamics (Russian Economic Trends, 1/97).
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40% in 1994.  There is not much variation across age groups, although those 30 years and younger
seem to do a little better.
Variation in wage arrears is substantial across regions, (upper panel of Table 5).  In
Moscow City more than three-quarters of all employees received a complete wage on time, while
in Chelyabinsk only one-third did so. In Moscow City and Moscow Oblast an average 6% of
employees have been paid an incomplete wage not on time, while the average is around 24% for
the two worst performing regions, Krasnoyarsk and Chelyabinsk.11 The proportion receiving wages
‘incomplete but on time’ in the three provincial regions is larger than those who had been paid in
full and on time.  On the basis of these figures it is hard to maintain the hypothesis that wage
arrears are not a major problem in parts of the Russian Federation.
One explanation for the divergent performance of regions could simply be that, as a result
of political lobbying, workers in the budgetary sector receive their wages complete in the centre
but not in the provinces.12  The data do not support this hypothesis as the middle panel of Table 5
shows.  If anything, workers in the budgetary sector in the provinces have a higher incidence of
complete wage payments than the average.  The worst offenders are not government agencies but
state firms in ‘production’,13 as the bottom panel of Table 5 shows.  For this sector we observe a
rise in the proportion of arrears amounting to roughly 10 percentage points for the provincial
regions and Moscow Oblast and around 15 percentage points for the city of Moscow.  The
coefficient of variation of the proportion of arrears across regions falls from 0.40 to 0.36 as one
goes from the economy as a whole to the budgetary sector, rising to 0.46 in state-owned
production.  The budgetary sector accounts for 35% of employment and 30% of all those in arrears.
In no region is this ranking reversed. This must imply that, in March 1996, differential regional
transfers of government funds cannot be the main reason for regional divergence in wage arrears.
14
The industrial composition of the regions could be an important factor in the divergent
performance of the five regions.  Certain industries were hit harder by the transformation process
and the legacy of planning has left certain regions with a disproportionate share of industries in
distress. As Table 6 demonstrates, there are indeed certain industrial sectors, which are
particularly bad offenders.  Only around 30% of all employees in mining received their wage
complete and on time.  Agriculture and manufacturing are the other two sectors which perform
poorly, (43% and 48% respectively).  For workers in distribution/trade and finance, wage arrears
do not seem to pose a major problem. Only 14% and 8% of workers in these sectors are in arrears,
respectively.
To see which factors are statistically significant, we estimate probit regressions of the
15. The results of this regression are available from the authors on request.
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incidence of wage arrears. The estimates in Table 7 show that within regions, enterprise
characteristics are the main determinants of wage arrears.  The larger the enterprise the higher the
probability of experiencing wage arrears. Working in finance lowers the probability of wage
arrears by 24 percentage points relative to working in other services, (the default), whilst
employment in manufacturing and mining raises this probability by 9 and 15 percentage points
respectively.  Ownership type is not a significant predictor of the incidence of wage arrears.
Among the occupational groups only clerks have a lower incidence of wage arrears compared to
the default group of managers.  Of the demographic factors only gender is important. Women are
around 3 percentage points less likely to experience wage arrears, other things equal.  
A third, notable result concerns the regions.  Having controlled for the demographic and
skill composition of the workforce, ownership and industrial structure, the regression points to the
overriding importance of regional location for the incidence of wage arrears.  The marginal effects
of residing in Moscow City or Moscow Oblast are 35 and 31 percentage points lower than for
workers in the provinces. The results of a probit regression for the budgetary sector alone confirm
this dominance of the regional variables.15 The marginal effects for the metropolitan centre are of
the same order of magnitude in both regressions and, therefore, seem to confirm that workers in the
budgetary sector in provincial regions are no worse affected by arrears than other workers.
The wide variation of wage arrears is demonstrated in Table 8 which presents estimated
arrears probabilities for workers with selected characteristics.  A male with secondary education
in a large mining firm in Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk has a 90% probability of being in arrears.
In contrast, a female with higher education in a small financial firm in Moscow has an extremely
small probability of not being paid on time and in full (1.4%).   While regional location is an
overriding factor, it is true that workers in a healthy industry but in a provincial region have on
average a far lower incidence of wage arrears than workers in a poorly performing industry
residing in Moscow.  Finally, individuals with similar characteristics have roughly the same wage
arrears probabilities in the budgetary sector. We take this as further evidence that employers from
the budgetary sector are not the worst offenders. 
Regressions within industries (Table 9) confirm the general previous results. Demographic
characteristics play a lesser role in the determination of wage arrears than do characteristics
related to the establishment and the region.  Regional location is the most powerful predictor of
wage arrears in all industries.  The regional effect is particularly strong in mining, where we have
pooled the provincial regions and the two metropolitan areas.  The incidence of wage arrears is,
in 5 out of 9 industries, an increasing function of establishment size while ownership type is only
statistically significant in 3 industries. Employment in a de novo private or privatised firm in
manufacturing, reduces the incidence of wage arrears on average by 10 and 7 percentage points
respectively, whilst transport workers in newly established firms are around 16 points less likely
to have been paid on time and in full.  Like the results from Table 7, the industry regressions,
however, do not generally reveal that ownership type is an important factor in the determination
of wage arrears.  Longer job tenure strongly implies a higher incidence of wage arrears in transport
and other services.  The latter result might be explained by the relative ease with which wage
concessions can be extracted from long-serving insiders of the firm.  In most industries, men are
less often paid wages in full and on time, the only exception being manufacturing where a male
worker's probability of experiencing wage arrears is 4 percentage points lower.  Variables relating
to age, educational attainment and occupation are of limited or no significance.
Regional regressions, (Table 10), confirm the robustness of the results from the full sample.
Industry affiliation and firm characteristics matter most in the determination of wage arrears.
8Mining firms withholding wages from their workers seem to be concentrated in the two provincial
regions, Krasnoyarsk and Chelyabinsk, and finance and manufacturing are not significantly different
from the default category other services in Chelyabinsk.  In all regions but Krasnoyarsk, larger
establishment size implies a higher incidence of wage arrears, while the ownership variable is
either insignificant or produces ambiguous results.  In this context, it is particularly interesting that
only in Krasnoyarsk does working in a de novo private firm coincide with prompt wage payments.
In the provinces, higher educational attainment lowers the probability of wage arrears and prime-
age workers are particularly hard hit in all regions apart from Chuvashy.    
      
Evidence from RLMS 1994-1996
As Figure 1 shows, the problem of wage arrears became more acute between 1994 and 1996. The
distribution of arrears moves to the right and becomes flatter, indicating that arrears are increasing
and becoming more widespread over this period. In 1994, the distribution is concentrated around
the 300,000 rouble level, roughly equivalent to the average monthly salary.  By 1996, the
distribution of arrears is less concentrated around the peak.  Figure 2 plots the wage and arrears
distributions together in order to gauge the size of the arrears bill. Again, it is apparent that the
distribution of wage arrears has grown relative to the completed wage bill. According to the
RLMS, the incidence of wage arrears grew from 43% in 1994 to 45% in 1995 and 62% in 1996.
As one means of determining whether personal characteristics matter for the incidence of arrears,
Figure 3 compares the initial monthly wage distribution of those who subsequently experienced
arrears with those in the sample who did not. The wage distribution of those subsequently in
arrears lies a little to the left of those who are not in arrears in the following period, indicating
that, if anything, arrears affect those in the lower parts of the wage distribution, though the
differences are not large. 
Table 11 presents the results of probit estimates on the incidence of wage arrears across
the Russian Federation using the RLMS. We present the results from simple pooling across the
three waves alongside random effects estimates, which control for heterogeneity.  Assuming that
this heterogeneity is time invariant so that 
A*it = X'itB + vit I =1,...,N   t =1,2,3 (1)
where Ait = 1 if A*it >0, = 0 otherwise and A*it is the unobserved propensity to receive wage
arrears, X is a vector of time varying and time invariant regressors and v is the error term with
vit = ai + uit (2)
and ai is the random effect, with ai ~N(0, s 2a ) independently of uit and the X vector. Each
disturbance term thus has variance Var(vit) = Var( s 2a +s  2u) and the correlation between error
terms for the same individual is given by
Corr(ai + uit, ai + uis ) =  ?  =  s  2a /(s  2a + s  2u) (3)
The parameters of the likelihood function, which comprises this model, are estimated using the
iterative techniques in Stata. The simple pooled probit model is equivalent to assuming that 
? = 0.
Consistent with the evidence from the RLFS, personal characteristics do little to influence
the probability of being in arrears.  The characteristics of the establishment and the region in which
16. The RLMS indicates that around 9.9% of those in arrears left employment one year later, compared with
around 8.5% of those not in arrears.
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the individual lives have a much more important role.  Job tenure is now a significant determinant
of wage arrears, consistent with the idea that insider forces facilitate delayed wage payments.
Unskilled, male, prime-age workers living in the regions furthest from the metropolitan areas,
working in large scale enterprises for ten years or more are most at risk from wage arrears. An
additional rural variable is also significant. This may suggest that enterprises and workers living
away from the main administrative centres find it harder to plead their case. The estimated effects
do not change much as we go from the simple pooling to the random effects model.  In particular
the firm level effects continue to dominate, which tends to rule out the idea that discrimination
across individuals in the same plant is widespread.
Persistence of wage arrears
One as yet unresolved issue is how long wage arrears persist and whether the same individuals
are affected over time.  Rather like the stock-flow analysis of unemployment, if wage arrears were
shared equally across the population, there may be less cause for concern than if arrears were
concentrated on the same individuals.  To address this issue we simply count the number of times
an individual classifies themselves as in arrears in the RLMS, restricting our sample to those
continuously in employment.16  Whilst we do not observe the start of the arrears process, we can
observe inflows and outflows from the state, together with the cumulation of arrears.  Table 12
shows that over the three year observation period, a combination of rising inflow rate and a falling
outflow rate contribute to a rising stock of arrears in the population. The average amount of arrears
grew by around 40% and the amount owed rises monotonically according to the number of years
the individual is observed in arrears. Arrears are also distributed unequally. By 1996, one-quarter
of the sample working population had been in arrears in each of the three waves, whilst another
quarter had yet to experience any arrears. The size of the stock of arrears relative to previous
wages also grows from around one month salary to 1.7 months over the period, (Table 12). Note
that the median stock of arrears does not differ much between new entrants and those in arrears
previously, (the final column of panel b). This suggests that those in arrears have some of their debt
paid off during the year.
In order to identify the characteristics of those persistently in arrears, Table 13 presents
the results of ordered probit estimates of the probability that an individual will, in wave 3, have
been observed in arrears 0, 1, 2 or 3 times. This avoids the problem of introducing lagged
dependent variables into a regression, which could otherwise deliver inconsistent estimates.  The
ordered probit results mirror the simple binary probit estimates. Unskilled, male, prime-age
workers living in the regions furthest from the metropolitan areas, working in large scale
enterprises for ten years or more are most at risk from multiple wage arrears.  In addition, in order
to distinguish between the extensive and intensive nature of arrears, we present Tobit estimates of
the amount of arrears, (Tobit because those not in arrears are censored at zero). We estimate the
determinants of both the total stock of arrears for each worker, indexed for inflation, and the
amount of arrears relative to previous earnings, for those who are not in arrears at the start of our
sample. Those not in arrears are coded zero, for both equations. The Tobit estimates (Table 14)
follow the same basic pattern as for the incidence of arrears.  The level of arrears, but not the
relative measure, is reduced significantly by the presence of foreign ownership at the
establishment.  Few of the personal characteristics retain any statistical significance.  Firm size,
17. The marginal effects in the Tobit regressions are given by d E[y/xi]/dxi = ßiF(ß’X/s ), where the estimated
coefficient is scaled by the probability of being in the uncensored region.
18. Clarke, Ashwin and Borisov (1997) note that unemployment benefit arrears are now a feature in many regions.
19. Shleifer (1996) provides some evidence on how entrepreneurs differ in their perception of the reform stance
of their respective regional government.  Entrepreneurs in Moscow see their regional government as reform-
friendly and supportive of private business activities, while provincial entrepreneurs complain about an
administrative environment that is hostile to private business.     
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job tenure and region dominate.17
Arrears and Mobility
Finally, there is the question as to why, if firms don’t pay wages on time, do workers not simply
move elsewhere? This may, in part, be because search unemployment is not a valid outside option
in all but the most dynamic labour markets. Unemployment benefits are not available to job quits
and, when they are paid,18 are not large relative to average wages. Moreover, alternative
employment is perhaps only available in the most dynamic regions, typically Moscow and St.
Petersburg and the claim on arrears may be loosened once the worker leaves the establishment.
There are therefore push effects from arrears and a dynamic outside labour market and potentially
offsetting pull effects from the need or ability to recoup arrears, magnified when inflation is low,
and a depressed outside labour market. 
To try and capture these effects we measure three types of mobility over the course of a
year. The first a movement from employment to employment with a new establishment; the second
a move from employment to unemployment and the third the move from employment to non-
employment. We introduce a variable to capture whether the worker was in arrears one year
earlier and run probit regressions on the determinants of these discrete events, (Table 15).  The
arrears variable is significant and positive only for job-to-job moves.  The push influence is not
offset by the inducement to stay and retain employment and/or arrears.  We then interact the arrears
dummy with the dummy for the metropolitan areas of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This interaction
term is again significant in the job-to-job move equation. In the metropolitan areas, those in arrears
are much more likely than other workers to be found in a new job one year later. Thus the exit
option is only valid in a relatively prosperous labour market. Thus quits could induce firms to pay
wages, but this strategy only works if there are viable outside opportunities.
Implications 
The results show convincingly, in our opinion, that regional transfers of government wages in the
budgetary sector are not mainly responsible for the larger incidence of wage arrears occurring in
provincial regions compared to Moscow.  In March 1996, the proportion in arrears across the five
regions was higher in the economy as a whole than in the budgetary sector. A cynical interpretation
of the large regional divergence in wage arrears could be that historically, rebellion and revolution
in Russia has only been successful if carried by the central urban agglomerations.  Confining the
problem of wage arrears to the provinces might allow transition to proceed more smoothly.  Our
evidence points in this direction, as regional location is a key determinant of wage arrears
independent of industry and ownership.  The Moscow regional government has helped generate
an environment through its reform programmes and access to the central government that allows
firms to survive and even prosper.19 A larger share of foreign ownership and a more dynamic
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labour market have, in turn, helped mitigate the arrears problem.
     The interesting issue of whether wage arrears are essentially a ploy by managers to extract tax
concessions from the central government cannot be addressed well with the household level data
at our disposal.  Still, one should note the large regional variation in the incidence of wage arrears
and the fact that employees working for de novo private firms are, in general, as affected by wage
arrears as workers in privatised and state-owned firms.  Whether such evidence raises doubts
about the motives of managers is certainly an open question, which we do not pursue here.
      There is an argument that disputes the importance of wage arrears from the perspective of
Russian employees.  It states that workers tolerate wage arrears in their primary employment,
because most of them hold multiple jobs with income sources in secondary and tertiary
employment much more important than the income source from primary employment.  Our evidence
does not support this statement.  Employees who face wage arrears exercise their quit option in
the metropolitan centre, but not in the provincial regions.  The fact that they do not do this in the
provincial regions is not because they do not care about primary employment, but because they
have no outside jobs to move to.  The presence or absence of outside options might best explain
the large regional variation of wage arrears. The incidence of wage arrears is not spurious but a
reality affecting many people, making their labour market experience in transition particularly
insecure. 
     There is also evidence of polarisation in the incidence of arrears across the working
population. Some people seem to never suffer from wage arrears whilst others do so continuously.
This may be due to the uneven incidence of wage arrears across sectors rather than some kind of
extreme efficiency wage strategy by firms, since observable characteristics do not drive the arrears
problem, nor do controls for unobserved heterogeneity alter these findings.
5.  Conclusions      
In the context of the relatively small falls in employment since the beginning of reform, the
evidence on job security in Russia is quite compelling.  On the quantity side, Russian workers in
1996 faced relatively secure job prospects.  The overwhelming majority of employees had a
permanent contract and worked full-time. There is evidence of variation in the type of employment
contract across ownership type. In SOEs and privatised firms permanent employment contracts had
been given to nearly 100% of the employees, whilst around 10% of the workforce in de novo
private firms had to be satisfied with a fixed term or one-off contract.  So, as the employment share
of de novo private firms increases in future one would expect a growing share of less secure
employment contracts.  The evidence on new jobs, where 22% of the workforce in de novo private
firms had to be satisfied with non-permanent jobs, strengthens this conclusion.  It is also clear that
temporary layoffs and unpaid leave affect only a very small percentage of the workforce.  In
addition, short-time work seems not to be a way by which Russian firms maintain employment
levels.   Despite major demand shocks which have put many Russian enterprises in great financial
difficulties, these enterprises seem to try to hold on to their employees by offering relatively secure
employment prospects.  Such an impression has been formed previously on the basis of case
studies (eg Metalina, 1996).  The same findings are confirmed here.            
However, adjustments to demand shocks seem to occur through price rather than quantity
changes.  Real wages fell steeply from the beginning of the reforms though had stopped falling by
1996.  The new adjustment factor is now undoubtedly the systematic withholding of wage payments
from workers in many industrial branches of the economy and this is now the dominant form of
insecurity for many Russian workers.  Moreover, wage arrears are a major problem for provincial
regions and certain industrial branches of the economy.  In mining, agriculture and manufacturing
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less than 50% of all employees received their wages in full and on time in March of 1996.  Miners
are particularly hard hit by wage arrears, with only 30% being paid in full and on time.  In the
capital of the Russian Federation and its surrounding Oblast, late or incomplete wage payments
affected 23% of employees.  In contrast, in the provincial regions of Chelyabinsk and Krasnoyarsk
nearly two-thirds of all workers had to be content with such payments. 
Our evidence seems to indicate that the central government sector is not directly
responsible for the high levels and the large regional variation of wage arrears. A dynamic local
economy can mitigate the arrears problem by providing a valid outside option with which workers
can exercise the quit threat.  The large regional variation in the incidence of wage arrears and the
fact that workers in domestic de novo private firms are equally affected by arrears seems to
provide some, albeit weak, evidence that downplays the idea that firms use wage arrears as an
instrument to extract tax concessions from the government.  Nevertheless, this is an establishment
problem.  Firm characteristics dominate individual characteristics throughout our study.
As ever, more research about Russian wage arrears is certainly needed.  However, the
evidence here lends support to the notion that wage arrears are an important problem, affecting
more than half the working population and averaging around one and a half months earnings. This
is the most apparent manifestation of insecurity currently observed in the Russian labour market.
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Table 1.  Distribution of contract types by Region, Age and Gender
Region Contract
 < 20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61 + Total Female Male
New
Jobs
Moscow Permanent 96.2 96.2 97.7 98.7 97.9 94.2 97.6 97.9 97.4 84.3
Fixed term 2.3 3.4 1.7 1.1 1.7 5.4 2.0 1.9 2.1 11.8
One-off 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.6  3.9
Moscow Permanent 91.6 96.5 97.6 98.2 98.4 95.3 97.4 97.9 96.8 86.9
  Oblast Fixed term 5.6 3.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 4.7 2.2 1.9 2.6 11.2
One-off 2.8 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.9
Krasnoyarsk Permanent 94.2 95.8 96.7 98.2 96.0 95.1 96.8 97.2 96.4 86.9
Fixed term 5.8 3.9 2.7 1.6 3.5 4.9 2.9 2.6 3.1 12.0
One-off 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.1
Chuvash Permanent 95.4 97.7 98.8 97.3 100.0 100.0 98.1 98.1 98.1 91.7
  Republic Fixed term 4.6 2.3 1.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.9 1.5 6.7
One-off 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 1.7
Chelyabinsk Permanent 98.4 98.6 98.3 98.7 99.6 95.7 98.5 98.5 98.6 93.6
Fixed term 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.4 4.3 1.0 1.1 0.9 4.6
One-off 1.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.8
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1996 RLFS  (12 927 observations).
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Table 2. Probit Estimates of Permanent Jobs , Workers’  Tenure less than 1 year
Explanatory Variable Sample Mean dF/dx+ Coefficient Robust SE
Married 0.590 0.035 0.275 0.138 *
Age 16-19 0.086 0.052 0.637 0.265 *
Age 20-24 0.228 0.040 0.381 0.183 *
Age 25-34 0.243 0.011 0.093 0.156
Age 45-54 0.138 0.009 0.076 0.194
Age >55 0.051 -0.128 -0.675 0.237 **
Children 0.599 -0.001 -0.010 0.128
Education
Higher, Higher
Incomplete
0.192 -0.034 -0.247 0.244
Secondary Superior 0.339 -0.015 -0.120 0.202
Secondary 0.351 -0.001 -0.012 0.207
Establishment size
6-25 0.259 0.072 0.745 0.171 **
26-100 0.315 0.092 0.928 0.177 **
101-500 0.191 0.076 0.920 0.215 **
>500 0.138 0.079 1.156 0.286 **
Hours worked
0-30 0.068 -0.383 -1.463 0.299 **
>40 0.857 -0.006 -0.051 0.264
Ownership
State 0.477 0.062 0.507 0.147 **
Privatised 0.202 0.069 0.777 0.192 **
Industry
Agriculture 0.026 -0.133 -0.684 0.338 *
Constructing 0.101 -0.053 -0.347 0.228
Mining/manufacturing 0.192 -0.024 -0.178 0.214
Transport 0.072 0.014 0.128 0.261
Distribution/Trade 0.249 0.014 0.116 0.179
Health/Education 0.113 0.025 0.231 0.263
Finance 0.022 -0.086 -0.494 0.390
Occupation
Other workers 0.070 0.010 0.086 0.431
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Professional 0.190 0.021 0.186 0.378
Clerks 0.054 -0.129 -0.684 0.425
Production 0.042 0.027 0.259 0.524
Craftsmen 0.143 -0.073 -0.465 0.402
Service workers 0.412 -0.101 -0.727 0.362 *
Technicians 0.050 0.057 0.813 0.472
Region
Moscow 0.279 -0.094 -0.623 0.202 **
Moscow Oblast 0.266 -0.082 -0.546 0.208 **
Chuwash Republic 0.050 -0.074 -0.449 0.332
Krasnoyarsk 0.219 -0.073 -0.475 0.223 *
Constant 1.044 0.531 *
Dependent Variable Number of obs =   1098
y=1 permanent job, chi2(36)      = 199.86
y=0 temporary
Sample Mean 0.875 Log Likelihood = -294.1
Pseudo R2     = 0.281
*=statistically significant at the 5% level **= statistically significant at the at 1%
+= dF/dx is for discrete change of dummies from 0 to 1
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Table 3. Actual v. Usual Hours and Involuntary Part-Time Working, by Region
Less Equal More Part-Time Involuntary
Part-Time
Moscow 4.8 92.2 3.0 2.9 62.4
Moscow
Oblast
5.3 91.9 2.8 3.0 84.2
Krasnoyarsk 5.9 87.3 6.7 5.0 80.5
Chuvash
  Republic 10.8 87.5 1.7 4.1 95.8
Chelyabinsk 7.1 91.0 1.9 2.8 90.9
Total 5.7 91.1 3.2 3.2 77.2
Source: 1996 RLFS.
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Table 4. Wage Arrears, by Age and Gender
Wages paid: Total Male Female < 20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61 +
RLFS
In full, on time 62.8 59.2 65.4 71.0 67.0 62.1 59.4 60.1 63.6
In full, not on time 2.7 3.2 2.2 1.7 2.7 2.9 2.4 3.1 2.0
Incomplete, on time 23.4 25.3 23.3 16.5 20.8 24.6 26.4 25.4 24.3
Incomplete, not on time 10.7 12.3 9.2 10.7 9.4 10.2 11.9 11.4 9.6
RLMS
In Arrears, 1994 40.6 44.4 37.0 29.3 36.2 43.9 43.7 37.9 34.5
In Arrears, 1996 59.7 62.2 57.4 51.0 55.6 61.4 61.2 63.8 49.7
Source:  RLFS, RLMS
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Table 5. Wage Arrears, by Region
Region
Wages paid: Moscow Moscow Oblast Krasnoyarsk Chuvash Chelyabinsk Total
In full, on   time 76.8 71.8 34.7 42.5 33.7 62.3
In full, not  on time 2.5 2.6 3.5 1.7 2.8 2.7
Incomplete ,  on time 15.3 19.4 39.6 41.7 39.9 24.3
Incomplete, not on time 5.4 6.2 22.1 14.2 23.5 10.8
Budgetary Sector
Region
Wages paid: Moscow Moscow Oblast Krasnoyarsk Chuvash Chelyabinsk Total
In full, on   time 79.3 79.2 36.4 49.3 41.9 68.5
In full,  not  on time 2.6 1.4 3.5 1.8 4.6 2.5
Incomplete, on time 14.0 15.1 43.4 41.8 42.1 22.3
Incomplete, not on time 4.0 4.3 16.7 7.0 11.4 6.6
State Firms in Production
Region
Wages paid: Moscow Moscow Oblast Krasnoyarsk Chuvash Chelyabinsk Total
In full, on   time 62.3 62.7 23.6 31.2 25.9 53.1
In full, not   on time 3.8 3.9 4.9 1.3 1.3 3.6
Incomplete,  on time 23.7 25.5 45.5 42.9 37.9 29.0
Incomplete, not on time 10.3 7.9 26.0 24.7 34.8 14.3
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Table 6. Wage Arrears by Industry
Industry
Wages paid: Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Mining Transport Distribution/
trade
In full, on time 55.1 47.6 54.3 32.5 65.2 86.3
In full, not on
time
3.3 3.0 3.5 3.1 3.2 2.3
Incomplete on
time
21.9 30.8 29.4 43.1 24.2 8.6
Incomplete, Not
on time
19.8 18.5 12.9 21.2 7.3 2.7
Empl. share   2.6 24.7 8.6 2.0 9.9 12.4
Finance Health/education Other services Total
In full,  on time 92.4 68.0 66.9 63.0
In full,  not on time 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.7
Incomplete, on
time
4.5 23.8 22.4 23.8
Incomplete,  not on
time
1.4 5.7 8.2 10.5
Empl. share 2.3 14.7 22.7 100
Source: 1996 RLFS (12 711 observations).
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Table 7. Probit Estimates of Wage Arrears
Explanatory
Variable
Sample Mean dF/dx+ Coefficient Robust SE
Male 0.497 0.032 0.086 0.029 **
Children 0.418 0.019 0.051 0.028
Married 0.722 -0.004 -0.010 0.031
Age 16-19 0.016 -0.058 -0.160 0.106
Age 20-24 0.087 -0.042 -0.117 0.056 *
Age 25-34 0.214 -0.056 -0.153 0.036 **
Age 45-54 0.238 -0.009 -0.025 0.035
Age 55-64 0.115 -0.025 -0.069 0.045
Age >65 0.022 0.036 0.096 0.095
Hours worked
0-30 0.055 0.040 0.107 0.068
40 0.774 -0.051 -0.134 0.045 **
>40 0.070 -0.023 -0.062 0.065
Education
Higher 0.271 -0.045 -0.122 0.057 *
Higher Incomplete 0.019 -0.068 -0.191 0.109
Secondary
Superior
0.339 -0.033 -0.091 0.050
Secondary 0.282 -0.007 -0.018 0.049
Occupation
Professional 0.322 0.024 0.064 0.046
Clerks 0.051 -0.091 -0.257 0.073 **
Production 0.049 0.009 0.024 0.072
Craftsmen 0.111 0.035 0.093 0.058
Service workers 0.244 0.003 0.009 0.052
Technicians 0.063 -0.018 -0.048 0.066
Other workers 0.060 0.006 0.016 0.067
Job Tenure4
2-5 years 0.288 0.001 0.003 0.050
 >5 years 0.621 0.025 0.067 0.051
Establishment size
6-25 0.148 0.075 0.199 0.092 *
26-100 0.320 0.107 0.284 0.090 **
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101-500 0.287 0.177 0.466 0.092 **
>500 0.221 0.224 0.583 0.094 **
Industry
Agriculture 0.026 -0.017 -0.045 0.088
Manufacturing 0.248 0.093 0.246 0.040 **
Constructing 0.087 0.098 0.257 0.050 **
Mining 0.020 0.154 0.395 0.091 **
Transport 0.100 -0.044 -0.120 0.047 *
Distribution/Trade 0.126 -0.167 -0.495 0.054 **
Finance 0.023 -0.243 -0.832 0.119 **
Health/Education 0.148 -0.055 -0.153 0.047 **
Ownership
De Novo Private 0.125 -0.029 -0.080 0.047
Privatised 0.181 -0.009 -0.024 0.038
Region
Moscow 0.402 -0.347 -1.001 0.042 **
Moscow Oblast 0.292 -0.316 -0.960 0.044 **
Krasnoyarsk 0.136 0.004 0.012 0.051
Chuwash Republic 0.045 -0.053 -0.147 0.069 *
Constant 0.098 0.130
Dependent Variable Number of obs =  11900
y=1,wage arrears  chi2(43)      =2105.64
y=0, payment complete and in time  Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Mean = 0.389 Log Likelihood =  -6621.918
Pseudo R2     = 0.1571
r
38
Table 8. Probabilities of Wage Arrears for selected characteristics
Characteristics Male Female
(Default) 35-44 years, any tenure, secondary education or
lower, firm size < 26, in other services, any ownership type, in
Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk, any occupation but clerks
.572 .539
35-44 years, any tenure, secondary education or
lower, firm size >500, in mining, any ownership type, in Chelyabinsk or
Krasnoyarsk, any occupation but clerks
.877 .859
35-44 years, any tenure, secondary education or
lower, firm size>500, in manufacturing, any ownership type, in
Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk, any occupation but clerks
.844 .823
35-44 years, any tenure, secondary education or
lower, firm size>500, in manufacturing, any ownership type, in Moscow,
any occupation but clerks
.504 .470
35-44 years, any tenure, secondary education or
lower, firm size < 26, in manufacturing, any ownership type, in Moscow,
clerks
.203 .180
35-44 years, any tenure, secondary education or
lower, firm size>500, in manufacturing, any ownership type, in Chuvash
Republic, any occupation but clerks
.806 .782
20-24 years, any tenure, higher education, firm size < 26,
in finance, any ownership type, in Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk,
any occupation but clerks
.187 .165
20-24 years, any tenure, higher education, firm size < 26,
in finance, any ownership type, in Moscow, any occupation but clerks .029 .024
20-24 years, any tenure, higher education, firm size < 26,
in finance, any ownership type, in Chuvash Republic, any occupation
but clerks
.150 .131
20-24 years, any tenure, higher education, firm size < 26,
in finance, de novo privatised firm, in Moscow, any occupation but
clerks
.024 .020
20-24 years, any tenure, secondary superior education, firm size < 26,
in distribution and trade, any ownership type, in Chelyabinsk or
Krasnoyarsk, any occupation but clerks
.301 .272
Budgetary
(Default) 35-44 years, up to 1 year tenure, secondary education or lower,
any firm size, in other services, in Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk, any
occupation but clerks
.681 .624
35-44 years, up to 1 year tenure, secondary superior education, any firm
size, in distribution and trade, in Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk, any
occupation but clerks
.907 .879
State Firms
(Default) 35-44 years, up to 1 year tenure, secondary education or lower,
any firm size, in agriculture, in Chelyabinsk or Chuwash, any
occupation but clerks
.458 .448
35-44 years, up to 1 year tenure, secondary education or lower, any firm
size, in manufacturing, in Moscow, any occupation but clerks .508 .498
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on Probit regress
Table 9
 Probit Estimates of Wage Arrears by Industry
Agriculture Manuf. Constr. Mining Transport Distribution/
           Trade
Education/
     Health
Other
Services
Variable dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
Male
-0.070 -0.038 * 0.090 ** 0.130 * 0.103 *** 0.061 *** 0.063 * 0.021
Children 0.056 0.024 -0.024 0.014 0.006 0.063 *** -0.018 0.035
Married 0.009 -0.022 -0.070 0.089 0.046 -0.016 0.006 0.019
Age 16-19 0.066 0.115 -0.141 16-24 0.173 -0.158 -0.090 * -0.038 -0.090
Age 20-24 0.000 -0.049 -0.140 * 0.009 -0.027 0.048 -0.043
Age 25-34 -0.134 -0.056 * -0.119 ** 25-34 0.002 -0.023 -0.050 ** 0.009 -0.075 ***
Age 45-54 -0.089 -0.010 -0.063 45-54 0.163 ** -0.018 0.000 0.016 0.001
Age 55-64 -0.191 0.027 -0.079 >55 -0.133 -0.193 *** -0.018 -0.001 0.000
Age >65 -0.026 0.034 0.087 -0.181 0.206 * 0.031 0.097
Hours worked
0-30 0.506 ** 0.049 -0.016 0.065 -0.072 -0.005 0.022
40 0.189 -0.082 ** -0.054 0.079 -0.120 *** 0.000 -0.111 ***
>40 0.528 *** -0.049 -0.105 0.089 -0.109 *** -0.036 -0.020
Education Education
Higher -0.243 -0.025 -0.138 * Hig./
Hig Inco.
0.008 -0.108 * -0.057 0.039 -0.013
Higher Incomplete 0.037 -0.149 -0.305 *** -0.031 0.015 -0.002
Secondary Superior -0.164 0.036 -0.084 Secondary
Sup.
0.074 -0.161 *** -0.006 -0.014 -0.015
Secondary -0.158 * 0.016 -0.014 Secondary -0.070 -0.076 -0.014 0.074 0.007
Occupation
Professional 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.147 0.045 0.026 0.122 ** 0.016
Clerks -0.062 -0.118 0.069 -0.016 0.056 -0.019 -0.156 ***
Production -0.124 0.005 -0.101 0.200 0.171 0.194 0.027 -0.039
Craftsmen 0.201 0.037 -0.126 * 0.200 0.012 0.027 0.168 * 0.102 **
Service workers 0.041 0.012 -0.138 ** 0.090 0.033 0.008 0.094 0.002
Technicians -0.035 0.011 -0.192 ** -0.090 -0.071 -0.020 0.013 0.003
Agriculture Manuf. Constr. Mining Transport Distribution
/Trade
Education/
    Health
Other
Services
Variable dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
Other workers 0.096 -0.012 -0.094 0.029 -0.009 0.007 0.156 0.033
Job Tenure
2-5 years 0.018 -0.070 -0.092 0.194 * 0.081 -0.048 * 0.071 0.084 **
>5 years 0.109 0.004 -0.116 * 0.378 *** 0.065 -0.037 0.024 0.109 ***
Establishment size
6-25 0.192 -0.047 0.053 -0.185 0.131 0.097 ** 0.069 0.057
26-100 0.322 0.110 0.182 -0.255 0.163 0.118 *** 0.143 -0.002
101-500 0.241 0.215 0.318 * -0.414 ** 0.222 * 0.170 *** 0.111 0.091
>500 -0.323 0.311 ** 0.414 *** -0.213 0.197 0.172 ** 0.093 0.117 *
Ownership Ownership
De Novo Private 0.492 *** -0.095 ** 0.080 Non state 0.067 -0.163 *** -0.029 0.020 -0.045
Privatised 0.470 *** -0.067 *** -0.009 0.012 -0.019 0.009 0.017
Region Region
Moscow -0.434 *** -0.338 *** -0.420 *** Central -0.614 *** -0.470 *** -0.159 *** -0.353 **
*
-0.320 ***
Moscow Oblast -0.453 *** -0.369 *** -0.347 *** -0.392 *** -0.115 *** -0.376 **
*
-0.274 ***
Krasnoyarsk -0.031 -0.025 0.133 * -0.078 0.011 0.173 **
*
0.052
Chuwash Republic 0.003 -0.126 ** 0.015 -0.203 *** 0.032 0.001 -0.052
N. obs. = 285 2913 1037 251 1203 1514 1782 2784
*=statistically significant at the 10% level, **=statistically significant at the 5% level, ***=statistically significant at the 1% level
Table10-Probit Estimates of Wage Arrears by Region
      Moscow Moscow Oblast Krasnoyarsk Chuvash Chelyabsk.
Variable dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
Male 0.024 * 0.027 0.033 0.035 0.038
Children 0.002 0.041 ** 0.004 0.022 0.002
Married 0.003 -0.010 0.007 -0.040 0.005
Age 16-19 -0.082 -0.127 ** -0.040 0.226 -0.005
Age 20-24 -0.021 -0.064 ** -0.010 -0.088 -0.025
Age 25-34 -0.031 * -0.101 *** -0.069 * 0.012 -0.004
Age 45-54 0.011 -0.010 -0.074 * -0.020 -0.039
Age 55-64 -0.034 * 0.025 -0.178 *** -0.012 -0.040
Age >65 0.017 0.086 0.197 -0.017 -0.171 *
Hours worked
0-30 0.105 *** -0.057 -0.121 0.164 * 0.119 **
40 0.002 -0.046 -0.084 ** 0.047 -0.129 ***
>40 -0.015 -0.019 -0.107 * 0.122 -0.200 *
Education
Higher -0.032 0.010 -0.121 * -0.227 ** -0.112 *
Higher Incomplete -0.080 * 0.106 -0.152 -0.299 * -0.038
Secondary Superior -0.018 -0.013 -0.008 -0.075 -0.052
Secondary -0.021 0.035 -0.018 -0.072 -0.020
Occupation
Professional 0.061 *** 0.033 -0.058 -0.202 ** -0.083
Clerks -0.080 ** -0.049 -0.212 *** -0.284 ** 0.036
Production -0.004 0.051 -0.057 -0.014 0.052
Craftsmen 0.043 0.068 * 0.116 * -0.131 -0.053
Service workers -0.028 0.112 *** 0.006 -0.224 ** -0.056
Technicians -0.018 * 0.060 -0.119 -0.101 -0.079
Other workers -0.008 0.045 0.020 -0.295 ** 0.063
Job Tenure
2-5 years -0.003 0.023 0.031 -0.124 -0.030
>5 years 0.016 -0.033 ** 0.151 *** -0.105 0.073 *
Establishment size
6-25 0.047 0.123 -0.053 0.198 ** 0.117 *
26-100 0.088 0.092 0.062 0.102 0.174 ***
101-500 0.187 *** 0.128 * 0.095 0.158 * 0.199 ***
>500 0.252 *** 0.266 *** -0.035 0.085 0.252 ***
Industry
Agriculture 0.095 0.043 -0.023 0.037 -0.319 ***
Manufacturing 0.101 *** 0.078 *** 0.112 ** 0.154 * 0.038
Constructing 0.063 ** 0.083 *** 0.154 *** 0.187 * 0.112 **
Mining -0.028 0.088 0.220 *** -0.081 0.189 ***
Transport -0.048 ** -0.056 ** -0.030 -0.100 0.045
Distribution/Trade -0.080 *** -0.183 *** -0.228 *** -0.127 -0.270 ***
Finance -0.140 *** -0.203 *** -0.515 *** -0.420 * -0.166
Health/Education -0.019 -0.114 *** 0.137 * -0.049
Ownership
De Novo Private -0.027 -0.013 -0.127 *** -0.130 0.030
Privatised 0.002 -0.028 -0.047 -0.223 ** 0.058 *
No. Obs. 4945 3508 1358 535 1554
*= significant at the 10% level
**= significant at the 5% level
***= significant at the 1% level
Table 11. Monitor Probit/Random Effects Probit Estimates of Wage Arrears
Probit Random Effects Probit
Sample
Mean
Coefficient Robust
SE
Coefficient Robust
SE
Male 0.476 0.107 ** 0.035 0.102 * 0.042
Married 0.508 -0.059 0.044 -0.050 0.045
Dependent children 0.578 0.067 * 0.034 0.071 0.039
Age
16-19 0.012 -0.315 * 0.138 -0.282 * 0.141
20-24 0.066 -0.088 0.065 -0.059 0.071
25-34 0.227 0.036 0.040 0.017 0.046
35-44
45-54 0.224 -0.006 0.043 -0.019 0.048
³55 0.129 -0.113 * 0.052 -0.098 0.060
Education
Graduate School
University/Academy 0.193 0.167 0.165 0.123 0.197
Technical 0.243 0.267 0.168 0.203 0.200
Trade School 0.149 0.158 0.173 0.106 0.203
PTU 0.085 0.158 0.175 0.134 0.205
Any Professional
Course
0.132 0.330 0.173 0.273 0.203
High school only 0.189 0.233 0.171 0.192 0.202
Occupation
Managers
Professions 0.018 -0.448 ** 0.120 -0.359 ** 0.115
Technicians 0.184 -0.032 0.064 -0.000 0.069
Clerical 0.147 -0.178 ** 0.058 -0.144 * 0.062
Personal Serv. 0.073 -0.377 ** 0.068 -0.307 ** 0.075
Agric. 0.066 -0.368 ** 0.071 -0.300 ** 0.080
Craft 0.005 -0.272 0.214 -0.314 0.246
Operatives 0.178 0.045 0.056 0.076 0.062
Unskilled Manual 0.201 -0.005 0.055 0.047 0.060
Employer Size
0-9
10-49 0.204 0.140 * 0.063 0.134 0.066
50-99 0.105 0.196 ** 0.071 0.197 ** 0.073
100-499 0.218 0.283 ** 0.064 0.302 ** 0.068
500-999 0.057 0.320 ** 0.083 0.339 ** 0.087
³1000 0.136 0.446 ** 0.071 0.454 ** 0.076
Missing 0.207 0.251 ** 0.065 0.242 ** 0.068
Length of Employment
0-5 months
6-11 months 0.093 -0.162 * 0.072 -0.199 ** 0.070
12-23 months 0.057 -0.041 0.080 -0.057 0.078
3-5 years 0.101 -0.033 0.069 -0.063 0.066
6-10 years 0.187 0.087 0.063 0.074 0.062
11-20 years 0.147 0.191 ** 0.065 0.148 * 0.064
>20 years 0.196 0.182 ** 0.063 0.173 ** 0.061
Missing 0.141 0.251 ** 0.067 0.218 ** 0.067
Ownership
Private stake
State 0.731 0.114 ** 0.033 0.087 ** 0.034
Foreign 0.029 -0.057 0.086 -0.043 0.087
Wave 2 0.337 0.121 * 0.048 0.111 * 0.046
Wave3 0.322 0.566 ** 0.049 0.559 ** 0.047
Region
Moscow/St. Petersburg
North, North-West 0.077 0.580 ** 0.075 0.594 ** 0.092
Central & Central
Black-Earth
0.188 0.168 ** 0.063 0.187 * 0.078
Volga-Vyatsnik &
Volga Basin
0.190 0.550 ** 0.063 0.568 ** 0.077
North Caucasus 0.118 0.298 ** 0.070 0.321 ** 0.085
Urals 0.161 0.364 ** 0.064 0.385 ** 0.079
Western Siberia 0.097 0.485 ** 0.071 0.497 ** 0.086
East Siberia & Far East 0.091 0.617 ** 0.073 0.639 ** 0.088
Area
City 0.068
Rural 0.250 0.699 ** 0.037 0.697 ** 0.046
Constant -1.251 ** 0.203 -1.215 ** 0.233
Probit Estimates
mean = 0.504
Number of observations =   8687
chi2(32)      = 1144.3
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -5384.3
 Pseudo R2     = 0.106
*= significant at the 5% level
**= significant at the 1% level
Random Effects Probit Estimates
Number of observations   =  8687
chi2(47)         =    962.2
Pearson chi2(8639):                8682.24        Deviance         =  10775.2
Dispersion (Pearson):             1.00       Dispersion       =  1.25
Table 12. Persistence of Wage Arrears
 1994 1995 1996
No. Times in Arrears
0 60.9 44.2 26.8
1 39.1 29.1 28.1
2 26.7 22.8
3 22.3
Arrears (000 Rs)
1  826.4
(912.9)
 609.0
(710.9)
  846.4
(862.7)
2  908.6
(952.2)
 1220.8
(1142.2)
3  1451.9
(1268.6)
Average  826.4
(912.9)
 783.5
(872.8)
 1176.4
(1133.6)
Arrears Relative to
Previous Earnings
10th 0.30 0.60 (.59)
50th 1.03 1.70 (1.68)
90th 2.70 6.30  (6.17)
Arrears Outflow (%)  29  15
Arrears Inflow (%)  29  46
Source:  RLMS. Standard errors in brackets
Table 13. Monitor Ordered Probit Estimates of Incidence of Wage Arrears
Variable         Coefficient Standard Error
Female -.101 .052 *
Married -.057 .054
Dependent Children  .074 .052
Age
20-24 -.203 .115 **
25-34 -.003 .061
35-44
45-54  .028 .065
³55 -.116 .080
Education
University/Academy  .143 .087 *
Technical -.011 .071
Trade School  .014 .078
PTU -.197 .093 **
Any Professional Course  .092 .081
Occupation
Managers -.394 .262
Professions -.029 .085
Technicians -.106 .077
Clerical -.390 .094 **
Personal Serv. -.345 .105 **
Agric. -.298 .304
Craft  .077 .067
Employer Size
0-9 -.487 .115 **
10-49 -.383 .081 **
50-99 -.291 .090 **
100-499 -.128 .076
500-999 -.168 .106
³1000
Missing -.180 .082 **
Length of Employment
0-5 months -.225 .131 *
6-11 months -.153 .142
12-23 months -.183 .108 *
3-5 years -.207 .081 **
6-10 years -.111 .084
11-20 years -.061 .079
>20 years
Missing -.273 .093 **
Ownership
Private stake
State  .153 .052 **
Foreign -.107 .126
Region
Moscow/St. Petersburg
North, North-West  .592 .114 **
Central & Central Black-Earth  .181 .095 *
Volga-Vyatsnik & Volga Basin  .552 .096 **
North Caucasus  .292 .108 **
Urals  395 .098 **
Western Siberia .582 .109 **
East Siberia & Far East .625 .112 **
Area
Rural .819 .059 **
Mu (1) -.584 .148 **
Mu (2)  .176 .148 **
Mu (3)  .885 .148 **
Chi2 (42) 458.5
Pseudo R2 .065
N 2533
**= significant at the 5% level   * significant at 10% level
Table 14. Tobit Estimates of Real and Relative Wage Arrears
Real Relative
Coefficient S.E. dy/dx Coefficient S.E. dy/dx
Female -403.8 102.4 ** -207.1 -.194 .409 -.069
Married   78.91 110.4    40.5 -.281 .441 -.100
One or more children  100.5 102.8    51.5  .284 .410  .102
Age 20-24   19.077 210.7   9.78 -.072 .838 -.026
Age 25-34 -61.631 118.5 -31.6  .065 .491  .023
Age 35-44
Age 45-54 -12.155 127.6  -6.23 -.331 .514 -.118
Age ³55 -44.554 156.1 -22.8 -.198 .624 -.071
Education
University/Academy -184.9 170.6  -94.8 -.863 .673 -.308
Technical - 55.82 136.5  -28.6 -.044 .558 -.016
Trade School -117.6 153.2  -60.3   .021 .635  .008
PTU -233.4 183.1 -119.7  .705 .724  .252
Any Professional Course  150.1 158.1    76.9  .147 .685  .056
High school only
Occupation
Managers   7.743 609.8   3.97 3.117 1.945 1.114
Professions  276.0 166.6 141.5  .407 .661  .146
Technicians  -62.95 148.9 -32.3 -.009 .602 -.003
Clerical -491.5 188.8 ** -251.9 -.985 .733 -.352
Personal Serv. -461.0 205.9 ** -236.4 -1.531 .814 * -.547
Agriculture -367.6 691.6 -188.5 -.892 2.427 -.319
Craft  260.3 130.8 **  133.5  .593 .547  .212
Unskilled Manual
Employer Size
0-9 -1271.7 221.9 ** -652.0 -2.595 .916 ** -.928
10-49 -988.3 156.5 -506.7 -1.681 .644 ** -.601
50-99 -568.1 171.4 ** -291.3 -.091 .686 -.032
100-499 -349.0 144.9 ** -178.9  .532 .593  .191
500-999 -765.8 210.9 ** -392.7 -1.120 .836 -.400
³1000
Missing -779.2 158.6 ** -399.5 -1.327 .657 ** -.474
Length of Employment
0-5 months -916.4 225.2 ** -469.8 -3.641 .951 ** -1.301
6-11 months -674.1 235.1 ** -345.6 -2.189 1.017 **  -.783
12-23 months -541.9 186.8 ** -277.8 -2.080  .760 **  -.744
3-5 years -317.1 158.7 ** -162.6 -1.008  .631  -.360
6-10 years -165.0 166.0  -84.6 -.437 .667  -.156
11-20 years -  75.7 155.5  -38.8 -.530 .625  -.189
>20 years
Missing -580.7 192.4 -297.7 -2.581 .790 **  -.922
Ownership
Private stake
State  169.4 101.5 *    86.8 1.021  .408 **   .365
Foreign -535.8 262.9 ** -274.7 -.918 1.025  -.328
Region
Moscow/St. Petersburg
North, North-West 1851.4 222.1 **   949.3 3.292 .887 **  1.176
Central  213.3 190.2   109.4 1.203 .711 *  .430
Volga & Volga Basin  615.4 190.9 **   315.5 3.039 .723 ** 1.086
North Caucasus  780.9 208.9 **   400.4 3.289 .803 ** 1.176
Urals  777.4 192.3 **   398.6 2.891 .723 ** 1.033
Western Siberia 1011.9 212.2 **   518.9 1.902 .845 **  .680
East Siberia & Far East 1483.3 220.1 **   760.5 3.724 .898 ** 1.331
Area
Rural  463.2 114.9 **   237.5 1.192  .536 **  .426
Constant 222.4 284.2 -3.217 1.141 **
Standard Error 1911.7  38.08 ** 5.938  .175 **
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.031
Chi 2 (42) 375.5 169.6
N 2462 1723
Censored 1042 1042
Table 15. Probit Estimates of Effect of Wage Arrears on Mobility
 Job-to-Job   E to Non-Employment  E to Unemployment
Coef. S.E. Marginal Coef. S.E. Marginal Coef. S.E. Marginal
Arrears last year  0.210* 0.061  0.023 -0.011 0.057 -0.002 -0.003 0.074 -0.002
Arrears*Mosc./St. P.  0.448** 0.195  0.066 -0.159 0.228 -0.025 -0.239 0.282 -0.016
Region
Moscow/St. Petersbg.
North, North-West -0.102 0.154 -0.010  0.007 0.171  0.001  -0.124 0.218 -0.009
Central -0.081 0.133 -0.008  0.242* 0.144  0.045   0.148 0.181  0.012
Volga & Volga Basin -0.097 0.135 -0.009  0.120 0.148  0.022  -0.218 0.193 -0.015
North Caucasus -0.140 0.149 -0.013  0.293* 0.153  0.058   0.253 0.193  0.024
Urals -0.047 0.137 -0.004  0.155 0.148  0.028  -0.040 0.189 -0.003
Western Siberia -0.216 0.153 -0.019  0.130 0.161  0.024   0.037 0.202  0.003
East  0.043 0.151  0.005  0.044 0.166  0.008  -0.025 0.215 -0.002
Area
Rural -0.230** 0.075 -0.022  0.095 0.068  0.017  -0.124 0.095 -0.009
Ownership
State -0.216** 0.060 -0.025 -0.019 -0.004
Foreign  0.076 0.139  0.008 -0.013  0.001
Constant -2.043** 0.292 -1.708** 0.318 -1.872 0.487**
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.070 0.070
Chi 2 (46) 231.3 201.9  94.0
Mean Dep. Var. 0.067 0.113 0.046
N 5313 4328 4060
Regressions include controls for age, education, gender marital status, job tenure, establishment size and occupati
Figure 1
Dynamics of Real Wages and Real Wage Arrears 1994/1996
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Figure 2 
Wage Arrears Relative to Monthly Wages - 1994/1996
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the RLMS.
Figure 3
Comparison of Wage Distributions of those Unaffected Affected by Wage Arrears
Wages in 1994
Wages in 1995
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the RLMS. 
Data Appendix: 
Regional labour market types in the Russian Federation
This annex gives a brief overview of regions selected for this study as being representative of the main regional
labour market types in Russia.
The City of Moscow, while interesting as a labour market in its own right given its status as the capital of the
Russian Federation, is also representative of a region with a diversified industrial base, like machine building, light
and food industries, production of construction materials and with a developed construction sector.  The
infrastructure of social services is relatively good, and large centres of science, medicine, education and culture
can be found here.  Private market structures are also more developed, hence the private employment share is
higher than in other regions.  Demographically, this type is characterised by low natural population growth and
little migration activity.  The registered unemployment rate is substantially lower than the average rate in Russia.
Moscow Oblast, which surrounds Moscow City, is representative of mixed urban-rural areas with good links to
major cities as well as adjacent districts with economies based on agriculture or forestry.  Such regions benefit
from spill-over from nearby cities, have significant industrial or scientific concentrations, contain substantial
agricultural activities including food processing, and have lower costs of living than urban areas.  Generally, such
regions have significant growth potential based not only on existing enterprises, but on the development of
greenfield sites and access to labour from adjacent regions within commuting distance.  This potential has been
only partially realised in comparison with the cities at their core.  Investment flows have been stronger in the city
centres and unemployment is higher in the urban-rural transition regions.
Chelyabinsk Oblast is representative of regions dominated, at least historically, by the military-industrial
complex.  Huge enterprises of heavy industry are concentrated there, especially machine building and metallurgy,
and are mainly related to defence.  There are many settlements in these regions where the labour force is entirely
dependent on these enterprises.  The low rates of restructuring and conversion of production, plus the dependence
on deliveries of semi-finished products and energy from the outside, have been major determinants in the dramatic
drop of production.  A high level of employment has been maintained until 1996 through support for some
industries from the federal budget.
The Chuvash Republic reflects the economic situation of agro-industrial areas where processing plants are the
main form of industrial enterprise.  These areas are not well endowed with minerals and energy sources.
Agriculture is geared mainly towards vegetable growing and cattle breeding and is carried out under economically,
and often also ecologically, suspect conditions.  A relatively high natural population growth and a low degree of
labour mobility can exists in these regions.  The fall in industrial and agricultural production is greater than the
average in the Russian Federation.  The infrastructure of social services is underdeveloped while the level of
registered unemployment is much higher than the Russian average.
Krasnoyarski Krai is typical of the industrially developed regions dominated by extraction industries, such as oil
and gas, timber production, fisheries and fish processing.  Agriculture is practically absent.  Output has fallen less
rapidly than the average for the Federation.  The demographic situation is characterised by a low rate of natural
population growth and a high level of outward migration to more favoured areas of the country, which has risen
substantially during the years of economic reform.  Most of these regions are in the northern European and Asian
parts of the country and make up a considerable proportion of the Russian Federation.
List of relevant supplement questions
Personal characteristics
How many children do you have?
How many other dependent persons do you care for?
Wage arrears
For which month were you last paid?
Did you receive this wage complete and in time? In time but incomplete? Complete but with delay? Incomplete
and with delay?
Wages
What was your gross monthly salary (money or products; and if applicable premia) from your principal job for
the last month you were paid?
Tenure
How long have you continuously been employed by your current employer?
Establishment size
How many employees are there at the place where you work?
Industry
In which industry are you employed?
Ownership type
    What is the ownership of the firm you work for? 
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